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THE IMPACT OF WISCONSIN'S




Wisconsin's new Marital Property Act' was signed into
law on April 4, 1984 and takes effect on January 1, 1986.
This act is based upon the Uniform Marital Property Act,2
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws on July 28, 1983 .... This new sys-
tem of property rights embodies many principles of commu-
nity property, the spousal property system presently existing
in various forms in California, Washington, Oregon, Ne-
vada, Idaho, Texas, Arizona, and Louisiana.3
It has been said that "[t]he Wisconsin Marital Property
Act is legislation primarily concerned with the property rights
of married persons during their marriage and when marriage
ends at death. It was not intended to make any basic change
to Wisconsin's existing divorce law." 4 However, as this Arti-
cle will show, the new law does bring change to divorce prac-
tice in Wisconsin.
II. CURRENT WISCONSIN DIVORCE LAW
What changes will the new act bring to Wisconsin divorce
law? First, it is necessary to understand that Wisconsin di-
vorce law is based upon the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act (UMDA).5 A review of the background of chapter 767 of
the Wisconsin Statutes demonstrates that UMDA brought
* B.B.A., University of Michigan, 1964; J.D., University of Michigan, 1967; Attor-
ney at Law.
1. 1983 Wis. Laws 186.
2. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT, 9A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter referred to
as UMPA].
3. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN
84-IB-1, at 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN].
4. Weisberger & Wilcox, A Brief Overview: The New Wisconsin Marital Property
Act, WIS. B. BULL., July 1984, at 99.
5. See Dixon v. Dixon, 107 Wis. 2d 492, 499 n.6, 319 N.W.2d 846, 850 n.6 (1982).
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community property principles to Wisconsin divorce law. An
examination of the history of UMDA shows that "[t]he Con-
ference's original proposal was in substance that a community
property rule govern the division of marital property."' 6 Pro-
fessor Krauskopf pointed out that the original proposal for the
division of property in the UMDA was in substance a commu-
nity property rule.7
Subsequently, section 307 of the UMDA was amended to
provide two alternative paragraphs.
Alternative A, which is the alternative recommended
generally for adoption, proceeds upon the principle that all
the property of the spouses, however acquired, should be re-
garded as assets of the married couple, available for distribu-
tion among them, upon consideration of the various factors
enumerated in subsection (a). It will be noted that among
these are health, vocational skills and employability of the
respective spouses and these contributions to the acquisition
of the assets, including allowance for the contribution
thereto of the "homemaker's services to the family unit."
This last is a new concept in Anglo-American law ...
Alternative B was included because a number of Com-
missioners from community property states represented that
their jurisdictions would not wish to substitute, for their own
systems, the great hotchpot of assets created by Alternative
A, preferring to adhere to the distinction between commu-
6. FAMILY LAW REPORTER, DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE AcT 57 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DESK GUIDE].
7. See Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41
Mo. L. REv. 165, 166 (1976).
In opposition to the original proposal, Judge Ralph J. Podell, then chairman of the
American Bar Association Family Section, wrote: "Mhe Uniform Law Commissioners
have decided to impose upon the large majority of states some of the policies and law of
community property states when they provide therein for division of only 'marital prop-
erty."' Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 7 FAM.
L.Q., Summer 1973, at 169, 175.
Professor Krauskopf rhetorically asked:
Why would the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws,
composed principally of persons from common law states, recommend a com-
munity property model for property division at divorce? The Commissioners did
not wish to foist the entire community property regime upon common law juris-
dictions, but they did want to incorporate the shared enterprise or partnership
theory of marriage-the heart of community property law-as a major guiding
principle in dividing property at divorce.
Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 166.
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nity property and separate property, and providing for the
distribution of that property alone, in accordance with the
enumeration of principles, resemblant, so far as applicable,
to those set forth in Alternative A. 8
A reading of Wisconsin Statute section 767.255 shows that
it basically follows alternative A. Although alternative B was
drafted as the community property alternative, "concepts of
the 1973 version of Alternative A go beyond the concepts of
community property law by providing that all property of the
spouses (which would include both separate and community
property) shall be 'apportioned equitably' between the
spouses." 9
Currently, three community property states follow alter-
native A and allow the court, at least in certain situations, to
divide the separate property of the other spouse. 10 However,
the distinctions between alternatives A and B are lost when
one considers that both alternatives are based upon the com-
munity property principle that marriage is a partnership.11
Thus, to summarize:
Both property division sections of the UMDA recognize that
the spouses have been partners in the marriage, and require
courts to look beyond title in deciding how much each
spouse should share in the assets to be distributed. Espe-
cially noteworthy is the fact that Alternative A goes further
8. DESK GUIDE, supra note 6, at 33.
9. W. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 625
n.11 (1982).
10. In New Mexico, Texas, and Washington, the court has the power to divide
or assign the separate property of one spouse to the other spouse, but there are
circumstances in which this power is limited. In Nevada, the power of the court
is limited to certain situations and the cases appear to not have been consistent in
this area.
Id. at 528. Since Professor McClanahan published this statement, the Texas Supreme
Court has ruled that separate property could not be distributed to the non-owning
spouse in a division of property at dissolution, stating that "allowing a trial court to
divest separate property, from one spouse and award it to the other spouse as part of the
latter's separate estate would impermissibly enlarge the exclusive constitutional defini-
tion of separate property." Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1982).
11. It is readily apparent from the new statutes in common-law states that they
have accepted one of the cardinal principles of community-property law, that is,
that marriage is a partnership, a shared enterprise, in which each of the spouses
makes a different but equally important contribution to the family and its wel-
fare and to the acquisition of its property.
W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 9, at 631.
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than community property distribution principles by making
all property subject to distribution. . .. Regardless of the
property distribution section chosen, a common law state
adopting the UMDA enacts legislation which specifically
gives courts the power to implement sharing principles at
divorce. 12
Therefore, section 767.255 of the Wisconsin Statutes is based
upon community property principles.
III. COMMUNITY PROPERTY PRINCIPLES IN DIVORCE
ACTIONS
A. Bonnell v. Bonnell
Wisconsin courts are currently deciding divorce cases on
the basis of community property principles. In Bonnell Y.
Bonnell, 3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that when Mrs.
Bonnel took inherited property and changed the title to joint
tenancy with her husband, she transmuted the separate prop-
erty into marital property. The Bonnell decision is analogous
to a recent Arizona decision, Grant v. Grant 4 in which the
court stated:
In the final analysis, the fact that a spouse puts separate
property into joint tenancy with the other spouse must be an
inference or indication that a gift was intended, but this is
12. Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital
Property States, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1269, 1287-88 (1981) (emphasis in original).
[T]he policy of community property was to establish equality between husband
and wife in the area of property rights in marital property acquisitions, in recog-
nition of and to give effect to the fundamental equality between the spouses
based upon the separate identity of each spouse and the actual contribution they
each made to the success of the marriage.
W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 24 (2d ed.
1971).
[T]he theory of the law being, that the marriage, in respect to property acquired
during its existence, is a community of which each spouse is a member, equally
contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal
right to succeed to the property after its dissolution, in case one survived the
other ....
W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2d ed.
1982) (citing Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transac-
tions, 19 BAYLOR L. Rnv. 20 (1967)).
13. 117 Wis. 2d 241, 344 N.W.2d 123 (1984), rev'g 111 Wis. 2d 337, 330 N.W.2d
237 (Ct. App. 1983).
14. 119 Ariz. 470, 581 P.2d 704 (Ct. App. 1978).
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considered only with all the other evidence bearing upon the
issue of intent.
Here, the trial judge determined that the wife intended to
make a gift of her separate property when she instructed her
attorney to convert the stocks into a joint tenancy
ownership. 15
The import of the Bonnell and Grant decisions is seen in
the doctrines of "tracing" and "transmutation." "'The trac-
ing of funds is a procedure which allows the court to find that
property which would otherwise fall within the definition of
marital property is actually nonmarital property under one of
the exceptions.' It has its roots in Community Property
Law."' 16 Generally, tracing refers to the mechanics of follow-
ing property through transactions or exchanges from the time
the property originally acquired its status as separate or mari-
tal to the present time. Transactions or exchanges merely
change the form of the property; they do not change the char-
acter of the property from separate to community or from
community to separate. 17 The concept of tracing plays an im-
portant role in the exception for gifted and inherited property
found in Wisconsin Statute section 767.255, as well as in inter-
preting UMDA 18 and Wisconsin's new Marital Property
Act. 19
Transmutation, on the other hand, refers to a change in
the character of the property.2 ° It can be thought of as a
reclassification: property is transmuted from separate to mari-
tal, or marital to separate, when the parties show an intent to
so alter the character of the property.21 Like the tracing doc-
trine, transmutation has its origin in community property
law.22
15. Id. at -, 581 P.2d at 706.
16. L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 125 (1983) (quoting In
re Marriage of Scott, 85 Ill. App. 3d 773, 777, 407 N.E.2d 1045, 1048 (1980)).
17. See W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL, supra note 12, at 2.
18. See UMPA, supra note 2, § 14 comment.
19. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.63).
20. See W. REPPY & C. SAMUEL, supra note 12, at 23.
21. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 16, at 132.
22. See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 12, § 144.
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B. Plachta and Arneson
In addition to the Wisconsin Supreme Court focusing on
the community property principles of tracing and transmuta-
tion in Bonnell, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided two
cases in 1984 involving property questions within the context
of divorce actions. In Plachta v. Plachta,23 the court held that
appreciation of inherited or gifted property remains
nonmarital. In Arneson v. Arneson,24 the court held that prop-
erty purchased with income from inherited or gifted property
is marital property. These concepts are consistent with the
Uniform Marital Property Act and the Wisconsin version of
UMPA. Like Plachta, section 4(g)(3) of UMPA and future
section 766.31(7)(c) of the Wisconsin legislation provide that
appreciation of a spouse's individual property remains individ-
ual property. Like Arneson, section 4(d) of UMPA and future
section 766.31(4) of the Wisconsin Act provide that income
earned or accrued from a spouse's individual property be-
comes marital property.
Only three of the community property states follow the
rule found in UMPA, in the new Wisconsin Marital Property
Act, and in Arneson: income from a spouse's individual prop-
erty becomes marital property. "In Arizona, California, Ne-
vada, New Mexico and Washington, income from separate
property received during marriage is itself separate property.
Idaho, Louisiana, and Texas, on the other hand follow the old
civil law system under which income from separate property
is community property." 5 However, all of the community
property states concur with the above rationale found in
UMPA, in the new Wisconsin Marital Property Act, and in
Plachta: appreciation of separate property remains separate
property.26 Therefore, the theory of community property
found in UMPA has been part of Wisconsin divorce law for
23. 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1984).
24. 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984).
25. Irish, A Common Law State Considers a Shift to Community Property, 5 CoMM.
PROP. J. 227, 237 (1978).
26. Even under the civil law system, however, increases in the value of separate
property due to natural causes, (such as inflation or external market pressures)
are also separate. Thus, in Idaho, Louisiana and Texas, ordinary income derived
from separate property is community property, but capital gains derived from
1985]
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several years. It is a theory of economic partnership. 27 So if
Wisconsin divorce law already considers community property
principles, what changes will occur because of the enactment
of community property legislation?
IV. DIVISION OF PROPERTY
The only direct change to Chapter 767, Wisconsin's di-
vorce law, is the addition of subsection (5e) to Wisconsin Stat-
ute section 767.255: "Whether equity requires reimbursement
of one spouse by the other because of certain transactions dur-
ing the marriage. 28
Prior to the enactment of this new law, section 767.255
contained twelve criteria for the court to consider in dividing
the estate upon divorce. The twelfth standard, "[s]uch other
factors as the court may in each individual case determine to
be relevant,' '29 is a catchall. A basic rule of statutory con-
struction is that a construction that would result in any por-
tion of the statute being superfluous is to be avoided.30
"[E]ffect must be given if possible to every word, clause and
sentence thereof." 31 Where the legislature used "two different
phrases . . . in two paragraphs in the same (statutory) sec-
such property may be separate and partially community, depending on how
much of the gain is attributable to natural increase.
The Wisconsin Committee on Marital Partnership Property Reform has con-
cluded that the civil law system best reflects societal attitudes of marriage as a
cooperative venture.
Id.
27. The basic concept (of the Uniform Marital Property Act), is to view mar-
riage as an economic partnership and to recognize that, notwithstanding the
technicalities of title, each spouse would have a presently vested interest in prop-
erty acquired during marriage.
In dissolution, the Act d6es not attempt to spell out how marital property is
to be divided, nor the extent to which separate property may be taken into ac-
count in dividing marital property. It does bring the parties' marital property to
the door of the dissolution court with 50/50 ownership, regardless of title. The
court would then procced according to state law and practice. This would not
be significantly different from such common law states as Colorado, which rec-
ognizes equitable distribution.
Wade, The Uniform Marital Property Act, 13 COLO. LAw. 220 (1984).
28. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 90 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 767.255(5e)).
29. Wis. STAT. § 767.255(12) (1983-84).
30. See State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 318, 324, 243 N.W.2d 410, 414 (1976).
31. Prechel v. Monroe, 40 Wis. 2d 231, 239, 161 N.W.2d 373, 376 (1968) (citing
State v. Columbia Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 141 Wis. 557, 566, 124 N.W. 502, 505 (1910)).
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tion, it is presumed to have intended the two phrases to have
different meanings. "32 Therefore, the addition of subsection
(5e) must add a meaning other than already found in subsec-
tion (12). What was the legislature contemplating?
Subsection (5e) must add a concept of "economic fault" to
our statute. Attorneys in divorce actions will have to review
the entire marriage with their clients to contemplate whether
there was economic waste by either their client or the other
party. Perhaps one of the parties spent money on an individ-
ual hobby or, perhaps, an extramarital affair. These events
should be brought before the court, since equity might require
reimbursement of one spouse by the other for these transac-
tions. Subsection (5e) should be repealed in future legislation.
V. ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING ATTORNEYS
The new law raises the question of whether it is ethical for
the attorney for a small business in which either of the parties
has an ownership interest to represent one of the parties in a
divorce action.33 This question was recently decided in Cali-
fornia. In that case, the husband owned a family business
that was community property. The husband retained the fam-
ily-business attorney to represent him in the divorce. Upon
objection by the wife, the California Supreme Court granted a
hearing and then transferred the matter back to the intermedi-
ate appellate court. The appellate court held that a lawyer for
a business owes it a continuing and undivided loyalty and
could not take sides in a serious dispute between the owners.
The court rhetorically asked what dispute could be more seri-
ous than the dissolution of a marriage. The court concluded:
We believe the proper focus should be on the fact that in
representing an ongoing family corporation, Mr. Kralowec
in a very real sense continues to represent wife .... We be-
lieve that the fact Mr. Kralowec continues to represent
wife's interest in a family business which will be the focus of
the marital dissolution is sufficient to disqualify Mr.
Kralowec from representing husband.35
32. Armes v. Kenosha County, 81 Wis. 2d 309, 318, 260 N.W.2d 515, 519 (1977).
33. Clearly, if both parties own the business, the ethical question arises.
34. Se - Woods v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 931, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983).
35. Id. at 935-36, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
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The court went on to say: "We conclude that, absent consent
or waiver, the attorney of a family-owned business, corporate
or otherwise, should not represent one owner against the other
in a dissolution action."'36
The question is only superficially different when just one of
the parties, rather than both husband and wife, owns all or a
substantial portion of the business. The new act does provide
that even if the property is individual property under the new
act, "[i]ncome earned or accrued by a spouse or attributable
to property of a spouse during marriage and after the determi-
nation date is marital property. ' 37 Furthermore, "[i]n a disso-
lution, all property then owned by either or both spouses
which was acquired during marriage and before the determi-
nation date and which would have been marital property
under this chapter if acquired after the determination date
shall be treated as if it were marital property. ' 38 Therefore,
even if a business is titled in the name of only one of the
spouses, both spouses have an interest in the business, 39 and it
would be improper for the attorney for the business to repre-
sent either spouse.
VI. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CHAPTERS 766 AND 767
The concept of deferred marital property provides that
property acquired during the marriage and before the determi-
nation date, which would have been marital property under
this chapter if acquired after the determination date, shall,
upon the death of the owner, be treated as if it were marital
property.4° This concept, also found in UMPA41 is based
upon California 2 and Idaho43 statutes. The approach is to
create a deferred property right that applies at death.'
36. Id. at 937, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
37. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.31(4)).
38. Id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.75(1)).
39. See Woods v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 931, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct.
App. 1983).
40. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.77)
41. UMPA, supra note 2, § 18.
42. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5 (West 1984).
43. See IDAHO CODE §§ 15-2-202, 15-2-203 (1979).
44. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.77).
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An example of this situation is when one of the parties, A,
purchases stock with A's wages during the marriage but prior
to January 1, 1986. Upon A's death, the stock becomes mari-
tal property and passes through the normal probate proce-
dures. However, if B predeceases A, B would not be able to
dispose of the stock by will. Furthermore, while both A and
B are alive, B will be unable to give away any of the stock as a
gift. On the other hand, during the marriage, A could dispose
of the stock, either directly to a third person or by selling the
stock and purchasing a gift for a third person. If that occurs,
and A transfers marital property to someone outside the mar-
riage, what remedies are available to B under the new statute?
B could bring an action for divorce under chapter 767 or
pursue a remedy under the newly enacted section 766.53,
"Gifts of Marital Property to 3rd Persons." Under the di-
vorce statute, B would have the right to add the asset back
into A's portion of the marital estate pursuant to section
767.275, if the asset was transferred during the period com-
mencing one year prior to the filing of the petition. On the
other hand, under section 766.53, B must commence an action
within the earlier of either one year after acquiring notice of
the gift or three years after the gift.
Under section 767.275, B may look for relief from any
property of either or both spouses which had been dissipated
by A, whereas under section 766.53, one is limited to an ac-
tion for the dissipation of marital property only. The relief is
that the property wasted or given away is rebuttably presumed
to be part of the estate for purposes of section 767.255. Under
section 766.53, the spouse may bring an action to recover the
property or for a compensatory judgment. Finally, under sec-
tion 767.275, one must try the action before the court,
whereas under section 766.53, a trial by jury is available.
These variations between the marital property statute and
the divorce statute must be considered by attorneys when they
look for relief on behalf of their clients. A further problem of
relief under section 766.53 is that it states:
A spouse acting alone may give to a 3rd person marital
property that the spouse has the right to manage and control
only if the value of the marital property given to the 3rd
person does not aggregate more than either $500 in a calen-
dar year, or a larger amount if, when made, the gift is reason-
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able in amount considering the economic position of the
spouses. Any other gift of marital property to a 3rd person is
subject to sub. (2) unless both spouses act together in making
the gift.45
Nowhere is there guidance as to how to determine whether
the gift is a reasonable amount considering the economic posi-
tion of the spouses. Attorneys must consider this ambiguous
language before they bring action under this provision. Even
the comment to the UMPA version of this statute states in
part that in addition to the $500 safe harbor provision, this
section "also has a less objective test of reasonableness with
reference to the economic position of the spouses when
made."'46 Rather than "less objective," the comment should
say "subjective." Only through litigation will we know how
the courts will interpret what is a reasonable amount consider-
ing the economic position of the spouses.
Future section 766.75 is probably not necessary to carry
out the intent of the new law because section 767.255 allows
the. court to divide all property owned by either or both the
parties, with the exception of property acquired by gift, be-
quest, devise, or inheritance unless upon a finding that failure
to divide the property would create a hardship.
Future section 766.70, "Interspousal Remedies," provides
that the court may order an accounting of the spouses' prop-
erty and obligations and may determine various rights in and
to the property of the spouses. "[W]hile it is not the purpose
of the section to open the door to a torrent of interspousal
economic fault litigation, it is nonetheless necessary to provide
remedies for conduct that injures the interest of one of the
spouses."'4 7 Unfortunately, the utilization of interspousal rem-
edies will, in most cases, lead to divorce court.
Furthermore, a question arises as to the use of marital
money by one of the spouses to pay a retainer to a divorce
attorney. Under future section 766.53, any gift exceeding the
value of $500 in a calendar year, or a larger amount if it ex-
ceeds the reasonableness test, is subject to recovery. However,
45. 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.53(1) (emphasis
added)).
46. UMPA, supra note 2, § 6 comment.
47. Id.§ 15 comment.
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future section 766.55 provides an exception if the obligation is
incurred in the interest of the marriage or the family. Is a re-
tainer which is paid to a divorce attorney by one of the parties
an obligation incurred in the interest of the marriage? In all
likelihood, litigation will be needed to answer that question.
VII. PAYMENTS TO SPOUSE AND CHILDREN FROM PRIOR
MARRIAGE
Future section 766.55(2)(a) states that if a party is ordered
to pay maintenance or child support or both to a spouse from
a prior marriage and no marital property agreement exists, a
spouse's obligation to satisfy a duty of support to the other
spouse or to a child of the marriage may be satisfied only from
marital property and all other property of the obligated
spouse.
A problem arises when one wishes to pay for the college
education of a child from a prior marriage, but the obligation
was not made a part of the judgment of divorce. In that case,
upon remarriage, the new spouse could object under future
section 766.53 to the payments. To prevent such problems,
spouses who believe that they may possibly find themselves in
that position should be sure to avail themselves of the protec-
tion of a marital property agreement prior to any subsequent
remarriage.
VIII. COMMUNITY PROPERTY TAXATION
Attorneys and judges in Wisconsin have long realized that
tax implications play a significant role in any divorce proceed-
ing. Wisconsin's statutes require consideration of tax conse-
quences in setting awards for maintenance,4 8 child support,49
and division of estate.50 With the advent of community prop-
48. See Wis. STAT. § 767.26(7) (1983-84).
49. See Wis. STAT. § 767.25(lm)(h) (1983-84).
50. See Vis. STAT. § 767.255(10) (1983-84). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
held:
We think in making a division of property or in granting alimony or both that
consideration should be given to the tax consequences. Disregarding the effect of
taxes may result in an unrealistic and unjust result. We do not hold that the trial
court must adopt as a solution a method which produces the least amount of tax
for the husband or for the wife, but in arriving at a determination of the business
1985]
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erty in Wisconsin, attorneys will have to learn a new set of tax
laws.
The United States Supreme Court has held that any in-
come designated by state law as community income is taxable
one-half to each spouse.51 An example is a husband and wife
who live in a community property state. During the year, the
wife earns $30,000 and the husband earns $20,000. Each
spouse is co-owner of the total earnings of $50,000 and will be
taxed on one-half that amount, or $25,000.52 Because of that
principle, a significant body of law has arisen to protect the
"innocent spouse.' ' 53 Each spouse may claim one-half of the
deductions and credits if the income is marital.5 4
During the pendency of a divorce action, the recipient of
maintenance is not taxed on any maintenance payments made
from that share of community income.5 5 Maintenance pay-
ments less than the recipient's share of community property
income are not taxable, regardless of whether the source of the
payments is community or separate.5 6 Furthermore, all sup-
side of the divorce the tax impact is a consideration which permeates the whole
process.
Wetzel v. Wetzel, 35 Wis. 2d 103, 110, 150 N.W.2d 482, 485 (1967). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has also stated that:
[Tihe duty placed on the judge in Wetzel involved a contested divorce in which
the division of property, both as to the amount and the form of division, was
made by the trial court. In the case before us, the division, both as to amount
and form, was made by the parties by stipulation in open court.
Counsel when entering into a divorce stipulation has the duty to consider tax
consequences to his client. The trial court is obliged to consider income tax
consequences in a property stipulation.
Wright v. Wright, 92 Wis. 2d 246, 256, 284 N.W.2d 894, 900, (1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 951 (1980).
51. See Poe v. Searborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
52. Half of the earnings are taxable to each spouse, even if the non-earner receives
no benefits from the earnings. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). The
income earned by a spouse is community income even if the parties are physically sepa-
rated. See Bagur v. C.I.R., 603 F.2d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 1979).
53. See I.R.C. § 6013 (1985).
54. See Stewart v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 821, 822 (5th Cir. 1938). The deductions
associated with the spouses' earned income may be divided between the spouses. See
Sharon v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1177 (1948) (Nonacq. 1949-1 CB 6). Each spouse
may claim one-half of the total income tax withholding made on community income.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.31-1 (A) (1984).
55. See Hunt v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 228 (1954) (Acq. 1954-2 CB 4).
56. See I.R.C. § 71 (1985).
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port payments greater than the recipient's share of community
income are subject to section 71.17
IX. MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Marital Property Act
on the practice of family law will be that portion of the law
dealing with marital property agreements. Except as provided
in the good faith requirement section,58 the creditor's rights
provision section,5 9 the provision concerning bona fide pur-
chasers, 60 and the child support provision section,61 a marital
57. See Rev. Rul. 62-115, 1962-2 CB 23.
Given the above basic rules concerning community property taxation in divorce ac-
tions, a better understanding may be gleaned from the following example. Assume that
Wisconsin has now adopted community property tax rules and a divorce was granted
on June 30. During the first six months of the year, the husband earned $40,000, and
paid $16,000 to his wife as maintenance. She had no other income. He earned an addi-
tional $30,000 during the last half of the year, for a total income of $70,000 for that
year. He paid to his wife an additional $16,000 as maintenance during the last six
months, for a total of $32,000 for the year. The tax returns for the year should show
that the first six months the husband had income of $20,000 (one-half of the $40,000)
and no deduction for maintenance because the $16,000 maintenance received by the
wife was less than her $20,000 portion of the community income for that six-month
period. During the last six months, the husband earned an additional $30,000 and had
a deduction of $16,000 for maintenance.
The wife, on the other hand, will show income of $20,000 for the first six months,
even though she received only $16,000 in maintenance. In addition, she will receive
$16,000 in maintenance for the second six months. Therefore, for the calendar year she
will have a total of $36,000 in taxable income.
The problem, of course, is that for the first six months the wife is being taxed on
$20,000 of income, although she received only $16,000. This situation must be recog-
nized by attorneys and courts.
To vary the example set forth above, assume the same facts, except that the husband
paid $24,000 in maintenance to his wife during the first six months, and an additional
$24,000 in maintenance during the second six months. In that situation, for the first six
months the husband would show income of $20,000 less maintenance paid of $4,000
(the difference between the $24,000 in maintenance which he actually paid and the
$20,000 which was presumed to be the wife's share of his $40,000 income). During the
second six months, the husband would have an income of $30,000 less a maintenance
deduction of $24,000. Therefore, for the year, he would have total income of S50,000,
less a deduction for maintenance of $28,000.
His wife, on the other hand, would show income of $20,000 for the first six months,
maintenance received of $4,000 for the first six months, and maintenance received of
$24,000 for the second six months, for a total of $20,000 income for the year, plus
$28,000 in maintenance received.
58. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.15).
59. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.55(4m)).
60. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.57(3)).
61. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(2)).
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agreement may vary the effect of the Act. Future section
766.58 sets forth detailed subsections concerning marital
property agreements. 2
A. Requirements
Subsection one states that the document shall be signed by
both spouses. Witnesses are not required. There are no for-
mal drafting requirements. No consideration is required
under the new law; the document need not be witnessed.
Subsection two states that the agreement may not ad-
versely affect the right of a child to support. Although child
support may be held open, it may not be denied.
Subsection three indicates that except as indicated above,
spouses may agree regarding: (a) rights in and obligations re-
garding either or both spouses' property; (b) management and
control of either or both spouses' property; (c) disposition of
either or both spouses' property upon dissolution or death or
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any event; (d) modifica-
tion or elimination of spousal support, except as provided in
subsection nine; (e) provisions to be incorporated within their
respective wills; (f) disposition of property without probate to
a designated person, trust, or other entity by nontestamentary
disposition;63 (g) choice of law governing construction of the
agreement;64 and (h) any other matter affecting either or both
62. A comparison of the new Wisconsin statute with section 10 of the Uniform
Marital Property Act shows that the Wisconsin law is almost identical to UMPA. The
basic difference is additions to the Wisconsin act in subsections (6) (c) (2), (9a), (9b),
(10), and (11) of section 766.58. A further comparison of the provisions in UMPA with
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act shows the two uniform acts to be basically the
same with generally only semantic differences, except for the enforceability clauses. See
George, Marching to a Single Beat, 6 FAM. ADvoc., Winter 1984, at 24.
63. This is what has been called a "Washington will" because of its utilization as a
will substitute in the State of Washington.
64. What were the drafters referring to when they enacted this portion of the stat-
ute? A reasonable answer might be that the parties could choose any forum in which
they have a reasonable basis to allege jurisdiction. In other words, there must be some
minimal contacts with a state in order for that state's law to be selected. In all likeli-
hood this section was intended to cover the situation in which the parties owned prop-
erty in several states or intended to move to another state.
On the other hand, nothing in the language of the statute limits the choice of law to
a state in which the parties have some contact, and it could be argued that the statute
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spouses' property not in violation of public policy or a statute
imposing a criminal penalty.65
Subsection four of the Act provides that a marital property
agreement may be amended or revoked only by a later marital
property agreement. In other words, if the parties decide to
terminate their agreement, they cannot simply tear up their
document. They must draft a new document, revoking the
prior agreement. Under the present draft, a subsequent di-
vorce does not terminate the agreement. Some provision
should be added to the law allowing for termination of agree-
ments upon divorce.
Subsection five provides that when agreements are exe-
cuted before the marriage of the parties, the agreements shall
not become effective until the marriage. Thus, marital prop-
erty agreements under this Act will not cover situations in
which the parties are living together without being married.
allows them to choose the law of any state if that is their desire. Nothing in the com-
ment to section 10 of UMPA aids in the interpretation of this subsection.
Furthermore, when one looks to the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA)
one sees that although section (3) of the UPAA is the basis for section 10 of UMPA and
future section 766.58 of the Wisconsin Act, there is no comment to subsection (a)(7),
which is the subsection regarding the choice of law. Therefore, it will be only through
further court litigation that we will have an ultimate determination of the meaning of
the words "choice of law governing construction of the agreement."
65. The problem with this subsection is that in the past, marital property agree-
ments covered non-property issues. Many times, the parties would agree to the reli-
gious upbringing of their future children, particularly in religiously mixed marriages.
See, eg., Ernstoff, Forcing Rites on Children, 6 FAm. ADvoc., Winter 1984, at 13. In
other instances, the parties would contract regarding lifestyle arrangements. Occasion-
ally, the parties would contract that if they subsequently had children, one party would
stay home and take care of the children while the other party was employed, or that the
parties would take turns staying home with the children. These were very important
issues, and the agreements served an important purpose. However, under the new Wis-
consin legislation, there is no provision for agreements on these non-property issues.
One may argue that the inclusion of these arrangements in the marital property
agreement is not prohibited. However, one can only contract to that which is found
within the statute. Furthermore, if a couple drafts one agreement regarding property
issues which comes within the statute, and then contracts in a separate agreement re-
garding non-property issues, what effect will the courts give to the second agreement?
Would the courts enforce both agreements?
Although this subsection is identical to section 10(c)(8) of UMPA, they both differ
from the comparable section in UPAA, section 3(a)(8). That subsection provides that
the parties may contract with respect to "any other matter, including their personal
rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy, or a statute imposing a criminal




Subsection six concerns the enforceability of agreements 66
and is one of the more controversial subsections of this Act. If
one spouse desires to prove the agreement unenforceable, that
spouse must meet one of three tests. The first test, found in
subsection (6)(a), is that the marital property agreement was
unconscionable when made.67 The second test, found in sub-
section (6)(b), provides that the marital property agreement is
not enforceable if the spouse against whom enforcement is
sought shows that the spouse did not execute the marital
property agreement voluntarily.68 Subsection (6)(c) provides
an additional ground to set aside the agreement. This subsec-
tion sets forth three standards, all of which must be met, to
show inadequate disclosure by the other spouse of property or
financial obligations prior to the execution of the agreement.
It contains language not found in either UMPA or the Uni-
form Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) which renders the
subsection unclear. The intent of the entire subsection is to
allow a party to request the court to set aside the marital
property agreement if the party did not receive a fair and rea-
sonable disclosure of the other spouse's property or financial
obligations. The question of what disclosure is "fair and rea-
sonable" will lead to extensive litigation; instead, the require-
66. See Frumkes & Greene, How to Get an Agreement Set Aside, 6 FAM. ADVOC.,
Winter 1984, at 20; Rutkin, When Prenuptial Contracts Are Challenged in Court, 6
FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1984, at 18.
67. What does "unconscionable" mean? This subsection is identical to section
10(f)(1) of UMPA. However, the comments to UMPA do not particularly assist one in
determining the meaning of the word "unconscionable." The comments do state:
"Although the Act sets forth a specific group of requirements for enforceability, they
are not exclusive. Ordinary contract defense is not specifically ruled out by the Act (as
lack of consideration) when made available." UMPA, supra note 2, § 10 comment.
Therefore, Wisconsin courts should look to previous court decisions to understand the
word unconscionable. See, e.g., Discount Fabric House v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 117 Wis.
2d 587, 601-02, 345 N.W. 2d 417, 424-425 (1984).
68. What does "voluntarily" mean? Nothing in the comments to either UMPA or
UPAA provides any guidance. Future cases will have to determine the question of
voluntariness when one prospective spouse requests the other to execute a marital prop-
erty agreement a day, a week, or possibly even a month before the wedding date. With
the wedding planned, the contracts for the reception having already been signed, the
dresses or tuxedos ordered, just how voluntary is the requirement to sign a marital




ment should be full disclosure of the other spouse's income,
property, and financial obligations.69
Subsection eight7" states that the issue of whether the mar-
ital property agreement is "unconscionable" is for the court to
decide as a matter of law. If legal counsel is retained by only
one spouse in connection with a marital property agreement,
this fact "does not by itself make a marital property agree-
ment unconscionable or otherwise affect its enforceability if
each spouse waived representation in writing. ' 71 If neither
party has an attorney, there does not appear to be any prob-
lem. Furthermore, if the parties retain one attorney between
them, then that fact does not by itself affect the enforceability.
However, since it is unethical for one attorney to represent
both parties in a divorce, attorneys should not represent both
parties in marital property agreements. An attorney who does
draft such an agreement may later be subject to severe criti-
cism if one of the parties asks the court to set aside the agree-
ment in a subsequent divorce.
Subsection (9)(a) provides that modification or elimination
of spousal support during the marriage may not result in a
spouse having less than necessary and adequate support, tak-
ing into consideration all sources of support. This subsection,
not found in UMPA or UPAA, appears to be a restatement of
Wisconsin Statute section 52.055(1), which provides that any
person who, without just cause, intentionally neglects or re-
fuses to provide for the necessary and adequate maintenance
for a spouse, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Subsection
(9)(b) provides that if a marital property agreement modifies
or eliminates spousal support so as to make one spouse eligible
for public assistance upon or after dissolution of marriage, the
69. In Wisconsin, the divorce statute requires:
[F]ull disclosure of all assets owned in full or in part by either party separately or
by the parties jointly. . . The court shall also require each party to furnish, on
the same standard form, information pertaining to all debts and liabilities of the
parties.
Wis. STAT. § 767.27(l)(1983-84). Why should the law require full disclosure upon di-
vorce, but only "fair and reasonable" disclosure in a marital property agreement that
may be used in a subsequent divorce? Anything less than full disclosure should not be
permitted by the statute.
70. The Wisconsin drafters inadvertantly omitted a subsection number when num-
bering this provision.
71. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(8)).
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court may require the other spouse to provide support neces-
sary to avoid that eligibility.72
Subsection ten provides that if the parties agree in writing
to arbitrate any controversies under Chapter 766 or a marital
property agreement, then the arbitration is enforceable.
Subsection eleven allows the parties to record a marital
property agreement with the register of deeds under section
59.51(18) of the Wisconsin Statutes. What have the parties
gained by recording that agreement? No recorded marital
property agreement constitutes actual or constructive notice
to a third party,73 and the rights of a bona fide purchaser may
not be varied by a marital property agreement.74 It appears
that the only reason to record the document is if that one
spouse is concerned that the other spouse will tear up both
copies of the document, and the spouse desires a safe place to
store the agreement.
Subsection twelve states that the documents signed before
the effective date of the new law are not affected by the new
law, unless the spouses provide otherwise in a marital prop-
erty agreement made after the determination date.
B. Conflicts with Wisconsin Statute Section 76Z255(11)
The test of the marital agreement provision is whether the
agreement was unconscionable when made,75 while it appears
that the property division statute looks to whether it is inequi-
table at the time of the divorce.76 Furthermore, the property
division statute provides that the court shall presume any such
agreement to be equitable as to both parties.77
72. This subsection goes beyond the language of either UMPA or UPAA to pro-
vide that a marital property agreement cannot prevent a court from imposing mainte-
nance if a former spouse became eligible for public assistance even after the divorce was
granted.
Despite this provision, the divorce court still lacks the authority to condition the
future payment of alimony upon the dependent spouse's receipt of public assistance.
See Whitwam v. Whitwam, 87 Wis. 2d 22, 27-28, 273 N.W.2d 366, 368 (1978). Perhaps
subsection (9) should just be deleted from the Act.
73. See 1983 Wis. Laws 186, § 47 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.56(2)(a)).
74. See id. (to be codified at WIs. STAT. § 766.57(3)).
75. See id. (to be codified at Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6)(a)).




X. MOVING BETWEEN COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND
COMMON-LAW STATES
With Wisconsin becoming a community property state in
1986, questions may arise regarding the property owned by
parties who now live in Wisconsin but acquired by them when
they lived in common-law states. Similarly, questions may
arise when parties leave Wisconsin and move to common law
states.
To address the first issue, it is immaterial for Wisconsin
divorce purposes whether or not people own property in com-
munity property states or common-law states prior to their
moving to Wisconsin. Wisconsin divorce law provides that
the court shall divide the property of the parties, regardless of
whether title is in the husband's name, the wife's name, or
both.78 However, an attorney faced with a case of this type
may wish to review other articles which examine the cases and
laws of the various community property states to compare
those situations to the one facing the attorney.79 On the other
hand, when a person is considering leaving Wisconsin and
moving to a common-law state (after Wisconsin's community
statute has been in effect), the parties must realize before they
leave that their interest in property which they owned in the
community property state might be treated differently in com-
mon-law states.80
XI. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VARIOUS COMMUNITY
PROPERTY LAWS
In this final section a review will be made of the manner in
which each of the community property states treats property
division upon divorce. The laws of the various states treat
property upon divorce in different ways. "[D]ivorce law has
always been considered as wholly statutory in the United
78. See Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84).
79. See, e.g., Note, Division Of Property Upon Divorce - Property Acquired During
Marriage in a Common Law State Except by Gift, Devise or Descent Should be Treated
as Community Property, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 789 (1983).
80. See, e.g., Cook, Some Things to Consider When a Traveled Couple is About to
Move from a Community Property to a Common Law State, 1 CoMM. PROP. J. 152




States."'" In the 1970s, all the community property jurisdic-
tions made major changes in their laws in the areas of man-
agement and control of community property, its disposition
upon the death of the spouse, the grounds for divorce, or the
division and disposition of community and separate property
upon divorce.82 As a general statement, it may be said that
California, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Puerto Rico now
specify an equal division between the spouses. On the other
hand, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Texas, and Washington now
specify an equitable distribution between the spouses. Fur-
thermore, the statutes allow some discretion to the court in
unusual circumstances and in dealing with alimony and
spousal support.83 It appears that the court can transfer sepa-
rate property of one spouse to the other in Nevada, New Mex-
ico, and Washington, but not in the other jurisdictions.
However, some states allow alimony or "spousal support to be
made a charge against and a lien upon the separate property"
of the other spouse. 84
When attorneys begin trying cases under Wisconsin's new
community property law, they must understand that commu-
nity property refers to a concept rather than a specific rule.
Therefore, in citing cases or statutes from other jurisdictions,
they will have to be aware of the variations between the com-
munity property laws of the other states.
XII. CONCLUSION
Although the Marital Property Act was not intended to
disturb Wisconsin's community property based divorce law,
the Act does present further challenges to family law attor-
neys. An additional element will be added to the property di-
vision statute. Community property tax laws will now be
applied to the Act. Marital property agreements may be scru-
tinized in accordance with statutory requirements. And ethi-
cal problems will increase. Anticipated problems concerning
the Act may be prevented through further legislation.
81. W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 9, at 525.
82. See id. at 529.
83. See id. at 531-32.
84. Sei id. at 530. However, in Texas the court no longer has the power to divide or
assign the separate property of one spouse to the other. See supra note 10.
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Whether they are or are not, family law attorneys must study
the Act, help resolve its ambiguities through litigation, and
protect the interests of varied, individual clients.
